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2. Abstract: 
An evaluation of the compliance to the ventilation aspects of airborne infectious disease 
control in Cape Town, South Africa. 
Dr. Conrad Groenewald (Registrar in Emergency Medicine, University of Cape Town); Dr. 
Jack Meintjes (Head: Unit for Infection Prevention and Control, University of 
Stellenbosch); Ass. Prof Brenda Morrow (Associate Professor, Department of Paediatrics, 
University of Cape Town);  
Abstract: 
 
Background: Tuberculosis (TB) is a major healthcare problem worldwide and is endemic 
to Cape Town, South Africa. Health Care Workers in Emergency Centers (ECs) are at 
high risk of nosocomial TB infection. The aim of this study was to determine whether the 
isolation rooms (IRs)in emergency centers, for patients with diagnosed or suspected TB, 
comply with set National Core Standards. 
 
Methods: This was a cross-sectional descriptive study of ECs in the Cape Town 
Metropolitan area. .The characteristics of IRs with regards to air changes per hour (ACH), 
negative pressure ventilation with relation to the surrounding areas and appropriate 
discharge of air outdoors or via filters before recirculation was measured using standard 
objective engineering methods..  
 
Results: 19 IRs in 8 ECs were evaluated, none of which complied with the National Core 
Standard’s ideal requirements for IRs. Five complied with minimal requirements .. Eleven 
(57,9%) IRs were designed to have negative pressure; and 8 (42,1%) rooms were not 
designed for isolation purposes, . IR volumes ranged from 15,5 m3 to 67,2 m3 (median 
35,6 m3).  
 
Five (26,3%) IRs were under negative pressure; 7 (36,8%) had erratic air flow; and 7 
(36,8%) showed positive airflow from the IR into adjacent clinical areas.  
Fifteen (78,9%) IRs had central provision of air via a ventilation system; 6 (31,6%) had 
central air extraction; 6 (31,6%) had local extraction; and 7 (36,8%) used natural 
ventilation only. Four local extraction units had zero flow rate. Airflow in naturally 
ventilated IRs was significantly lower than flow with other systems (p = 0,0002). The ACH 
ranged from 0 (n=4) to 112.37 (median 11,9); and was significantly greater in rooms 
ventilated with central extraction compared to other systems (p = 0,00002). 
 
 Discussion: The ventilation aspects of airborne infectious disease control are generally 
poorly implemented. This may contribute to, and fail to mitigate, the high risk of 
nosocomial transmission of airborne infectious diseases to staff and other patients utilising 
emergency facilities  in the TB endemic areas of Cape Town. 
 
Conclusion: Existing ECs should improve adherence to standards of airborne infectious 
disease transmission prevention in order to protect patients and staff from nosocomial 
airborne transmitted diseases, such as TB. New Hospitals should place a high priority on 
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4. Publication Format: 
 
4.1. Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature review. 
 
Research question:  
Do the rooms currently being used to isolate patients with known or suspected 
tuberculosis (TB) or other airborne diseases in Emergency Centers in Cape Town, South 
Africa (SA) comply with prescribed local safety requirements? 
 
Objectives of the literature review: 
To describe: 
• Airborne disease and how it spreads. 
• How TB causes disease, latent vs. active TB. 
• Force of TB infection 
• Global and local (South African and Western Cape) burden of TB disease 
(including Multi-Drug resistant (MDR-TB) and Extensive-Drug resistant TB (XDR-
TB). 
• The burden of TB on Health Care Workers. 
• The role of the employer in ensuring a safe working environment. 
• TB prevention strategies according to the World Health Organisation (WHO). 
• The importance of ventilation in infection control. 
• Current SA guidelines relating to the placement of a patient with known or 
suspected TB. 
• Current status of evidence around Emergency Centre practices for infectious 
disease safety. 
 
Literature search strategy: 
The following databases were searched: 
• PubMed / Medline 
• Scopus 
• Science Direct 
• Google Scholar 
• PLOS one 
 
Key words used: 
• Tuberculosis, health care workers, infection 
• Prevention, airborne disease, health facilities, infection control 
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• Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa, TB, burden 
• Developing countries, ventilation, WHO, Emergency Department 
 
Results (Narrative data synthesis) 
 
 
Airborne disease - how it spreads: 
Throughout history, human beings have been exposed to airborne diseases, which at 
times have led to epidemics of respiratory infections (1). An airborne disease is any 
disease caused by a pathogen transmitted to a human or animal through the air. When 
inhaled, these pathogens may or may not cause physical disease, depending on factors 
such as virulence and host immunity (2). The presentation of disease can range from minor 
to serious and may cause marked morbidity and even mortality. For transmission from 
one individual to another, there need not be personal contact with the primary source and 
transmission of microorganisms via the airborne route can occur a large distance away 
from the infective source (3). Airborne pathogens are usually spread via coughing or 
sneezing by the infected source. Expired bio-aerosols can travel over fair distances and 
remain airborne for an extended period of time. This is particularly true when droplet 
diameters are too large for diffusive deposition (>200 nm) or too small for gravitational 
deposition (<2 µm) (4, 5). 
Clear examples of the potential threat of airborne transmission include the dramatic 
spread of measles in the pre-vaccination era and the high death rate caused by airborne 
anthrax. (6, 7) There are many known potentially pathogenic microorganisms that are 


















Table 1: Potentially human pathogenic microorganisms associated with airborne 
route of exposure (alphabetical)	  
Organism	   Source	  
Aspergillus fumigatus	   Mould-contaminated building, compost	  
Aspergillus versicolor	   Mould-contaminated building	  
Bacillus Anthracis	   Bio-terrorism, animal handlers, 
veterinarians	  
Francisella Tularensis	   Potential WMD*, infected rodents	  
Legionella Pneumophilia	   Aerosols from water spray, water 
reservoirs	  
Mycobacterium Tuberculosis	   Person-to-person	  
Penicillium species	   Mould-contaminated building	  
Strachybotrys chartarum	   Mould-contaminated building	  
Trichoderma species	   Mould-contaminated building	  
Variola Virus	   Potential WMD*	  
Yersinia Pestis	   Potential WMD*, infected fleas	  
 
*WMD – weapon of mass destruction (9) 
 
 
How TB causes disease, latent vs. active TB: 
TB is transmitted, with rare exception, by the respiratory route, including droplet spread 
and as true aerosolisation into micro-particles (10, 11). Patients with active disease expel 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis (MTB) in liquid droplets during coughing, sneezing, and 
vocalizing. A single cough or a 5-minute conversation with a person who has TB can 
produce about 3000 infectious droplets, and a sneeze can produce even more (12). Once 
inhaled the process is described in 5 stages on a cellular host response level (2). Persons 
with latent TB infection do not feel sick and are asymptomatic. They are infected with 
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MTB, but do not have TB disease. Once infected, one of three clinical courses can be 
expected (fig 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Natural Progression of TB after exposure.(14) 
 
First, a minority (< 5%) develops a rapidly progressive disease that may or may not be 
proven with tissue or sample culture (evidence of bacterial replication) and is referred to 
as ‘active’ primary TB.  
By contrast, the majority of infected persons remain asymptomatic while harbouring the 
organism but develop an effective acquired immune response – they are referred to as 
having ‘latent’ TB, on the basis of a positive tuberculin skin test (TST) or in vitro assay of 
T-cell function (interferon gamma release assay, IGRA) (15). As a third possible outcome, a 
proportion of those ‘latently’ infected (1%–2% per year) might reactivate infection and 
develop the disease years to decades later (post primary TB) (16). Persons with latent TB 
infection are not infectious and cannot spread TB to others (17).  
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Diagnostics for Tuberculosis: Global Demand and Market Potential/TDR, FIND SA. WHO 2006:(18) 
 
 
Current TB burden of disease worldwide and in South Africa (including Multi-Drug 
resistant (MDR-TB) and Extensive-Drug resistant (XDR-TB): 
TB is currently the world’s second leading cause of death from infectious disease, and 
approximately one third of the world’s population has been infected with MTB (19). 
In 2014, 9.6 million people contracted TB and 1.5 million died from the disease. Over 95% 
of TB deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries, and it is among the top 5 causes 
of death for women aged 15 to 44. In 2014, an estimated 1 million children became ill with 
TB and 140 000 children died of TB. TB is a leading killer of HIV-positive people: in 2015, 
one in three HIV deaths were due to TB. Globally in 2014, an estimated 480 000 people 
developed multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB) (20).  
 
In 2015 the 20th edition of a global annual TB report was published. This report provides a 
comprehensive up-to-date assessment of the TB epidemic and progress in implementing 
and financing TB prevention, care, control and research at global, regional and country 
levels. The report used data from over 200 countries that account for more than 99% of 
the world's TB cases (20). Of these 200 countries, South Africa ranked highest in incidence 
rate (IR) of TB with an IR of 860 per 100 000 people (figure 2) (20). TB was also the leading 
cause of death in 2013 in South Africa with over 40,542 deaths notified (21). With an 
estimated annual case load of 13,000 MDR-TB cases, South Africa is placed 4th among 
countries where MDR-TB is highly prevalent (22).  South Africa is also known to have one 
of the worlds highest number of extensive drug resistant (XDR-TB) cases(20). 
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Figure 2: WHO report: TB statistics in South Africa. (20) 
 
 
The Burden of TB in the Western Cape and Cape Town, SA 
The Western Cape province of South Africa has the highest incidence rate of all forms of 
TB in the country, and Cape Town has one of the highest TB case burdens of any city in 
the world (23-25). These figures may be an under-estimation as the WHO is dependent on 
reporting of TB cases to national TB programs (NTP’s). Many sites in South Africa and the 
rest of the world have similar problems with underreporting (26). TB is either the leading or 
second most common cause of death in all races and sexes in people under the age of 65 
in Cape Town (21). 
 
Force of TB infection: 
The force of infection is a term used to describe the proportion of individuals uninfected by 
TB that become newly infected per annum, and is determined by the prevalence of 
infectious TB cases and the number of secondary cases that can be attributed to each 
infectious case (25). 
A TB prevalence survey of a random sample of the general population was conducted in a 
Cape township in 2005. The prevalence of laboratory-proven TB among HIV-uninfected 
and infected adults was 0.47% and 5.2% respectively.(27) After the community scale-up of 
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antiretroviral therapy (ART), the prevalence of TB among the HIV-uninfected population 
did not change, but the prevalence among HIV-infected adults decreased from 5.2% to 
1.3% (28).  
Studies conducted in Cape Town estimated the force of TB to be between 4% and 8% per 
annum (27, 29, 30). 
Effective TB control interventions that produced small reductions in the force of infection in 
Cape Town could produce large benefits in transmission reduction. Reduction of the force 
of infection to 1% would decrease the proportion of the population exposed to multiple TB 
exposures from over 50% to <0.5% and the proportion acquiring primary infection would 
decrease from 75% to <30% (25). The high force of TB rates in Cape Town also highlights 
that Cape Town is a high-risk site for the uninfected. 
 
Burden of TB on Health Care Workers: 
There is good evidence to prove that a large amount of new TB cases are due to 
nosocomial contraction of MTB and there are real concerns about the alarming incidence 
of TB contracted by health care workers (HCWs) (31-34). TB remains a significant 
occupational risk for HCWs in LMICs and in some institutions in high-income countries, 
with a reported high incidence of latent TB in South African HCWs (31). Risk of TB infection 
in HCW is likely to be particularly high when there is increased exposure combined with 
inadequate infection control measures (35-37). It has also been found that there is a higher 
incidence of nosocomial TB acquisition in the younger age groups, associated with poor 
treatment outcomes (38). 
Once a HCW is diagnosed with TB, there is a large strain on the individual due to 
emotional distress, the disease itself, treatment side effects, and the potential sequelae of 
chronic symptoms and pulmonary dysfunction(39). Affected and infected HCWs may also 
be likely to leave the profession or transfer to another field, which would result in loss of 
skill in an area where there is already scarce skills and limited work force (40). Furthermore 
the employer would be faced with the financial and service delivery burden of workforce 
loss, combined with the obligation to supply continuous compensation, as stipulated in the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (41). Compensation due to 
HCWs contracting TB ranked 3rd in the occupational diseases reported to the 
Compensation Fund for the non-mining sector of South Africa (42) 
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The role of the employer in ensuring a safe working environment: 
In South Africa, The Regulations for Hazardous Biological Agents provides detailed 
descriptions and guidance on the protection of employees against infective agents (43). 
These regulations also place the responsibility on the employer to “ensure the workplace 
is safe and without risk to health”. The need for occupational health and infection control 
programs is also mandated by the Department of Health in all healthcare facilities in South 
Africa, as described in the “National Core Standards for Health Establishments of South 
Africa” (44). Poor or absent infection control in health care facilities is considered 
unacceptable, contrary to set national standards and also illegal.  
The South African National Policy on Infection Control (SANPIC) presents minimal 
national standards for the effective prevention and management of healthcare associated 
infections, for both patients and HCW’s. This policy document states that every health-
care setting should have a TB infection control program in place, as part of an overall 
infection control program (43). 
 
TB prevention strategies according to the World Health Organisation: 
All health care facilities, both public and private, that care for patients with TB or persons 
suspected of having TB, should implement measures to minimize the nosocomial 
transmission of MTB.  
 
SANPIC includes the outlines and guidelines as set by the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) for TB control in resource rich and 
resource-limited programs. These include a 3-tiered approach for infection control: 1) 
administrative controls; 2) engineering or ventilation controls; and 3) personal protective 
equipment for HCWs.(45, 46) 
 
Administrative controls are needed to ensure that people with TB symptoms are rapidly 
identified and, if thought to be infectious, can be separated into an appropriate 
environment and treated. Administrative controls aim to minimize patient and health care 
worker contact time and should aim to discourage unnecessary admission to hospital, 
decrease overcrowding in wards and waiting areas and to limit the number of hospital 
visits. Emergency department (ED) overcrowding is a global problem with many potential 
sequelae, including prolonged ED stay of a patient who may be a source of infection. This 
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impacts on the implementation of administrative control measures, and leads to the ED 
being the potential focus of unrecognized nosocomial transmission (47-49).  
 
Administrative controls should be complemented by environmental controls and use of 
personal protective equipment, as these measures contribute to a further reduction in TB 
transmission (46). The environmental controls implemented will depend on building design, 
construction, and renovation and use, which in turn must be tailored to local climatic and 
socioeconomic conditions. Installation of ventilation systems should be a priority, because 
ventilation reduces the number of infectious particles in the air. Natural ventilation, mixed-
mode and mechanical ventilation systems can be used, supplemented with ultraviolet 
germicidal irradiation (UVGI) in areas where adequate ventilation is difficult to achieve (45). 
Personal protective equipment (particulate respirators) should be used with administrative 




The importance of ventilation in infection control: 
Although many global TB management strategies have focused on treatment roll out 
programs, the single most important way to reduce transmission and prevent disease is to 
interrupt institutional transmission (50). Airborne infection control strategies to prevent all 
forms of TB have long been a neglected component of TB infection control programs, with 
grave worldwide consequences (51). The WHO strongly recommend ventilation to be 
prioritized and states that the benefits of implementation of ventilation systems outweigh 
the disadvantages (46). Furthermore, available evidence reinforces the need to design and 
implement simple, effective, and affordable TB infection-control programs in health-care 
facilities in resource-limited countries (31).  
 
 
Current standards relating to the placement of a patient with known or suspected 
TB: 
According to South African guidelines, a patient with suspected or confirmed TB should be 
placed in a private room, ideally with: 1) continuous monitored negative air pressure in 
relation to surrounding areas, 2) minimum of 6-12 air changes per hour, and 3) 
appropriate discharge of contaminated air to an area of safety or a monitored high 
efficiency filtration of room air before circulation. If those conditions cannot be met, then 
the patient should be placed in a room with a simple extraction fan allowing at least 6 air 
changes per hour and/or a room with an open window and adequate ventilation.(43) 
	   15	  
 
 
Current status of evidence around Emergency Centre practices for infectious 
disease safety: 
Current literature states that Emergency Department staff are exposed to an unexpectedly 
large TB burden in the workplace, resulting in a high rate of TB infection and therefore TB 
infection control should be prioritized in EDs, especially in high-prevalence settings (35, 36, 
49). There is however a paucity of literature surrounding the standard of practice and 
adherence to standards regarding infectious disease control. 
 
Problem Statement:  
The clear and present health risk, along with the emergence of newer drug resistant 
strains of TB, highlight the importance of good infection control measures in South African 
healthcare institutions. Despite the clear importance and need, the current adherence to 
WHO and national standards of airborne infection control has not been studied in the 
South African Emergency Center context.  
 
Objective: 
The objective of this study is therefore to establish if TB isolation rooms in public 
emergency centers in the Western Cape comply with set National Core Standards 
regarding the ventilation aspects of airborne infectious disease control. 
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An evaluation of the compliance to the ventilation aspects of airborne infectious disease 
control in Cape Town, South Africa. 
 
Dr. Conrad Groenewald (Registrar in Emergency Medicine, University of Cape Town); Dr. 
Jack Meintjes (Head: Unit for Infection Prevention and Control, University of 
Stellenbosch); Ass. Prof Brenda Morrow (Associate Professor, Department of Paediatrics, 
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Abstract: 
 
Background: Tuberculosis (TB) is a major healthcare problem worldwide and is endemic 
to Cape Town, South Africa. Health Care Workers in Emergency Centers (ECs) are at 
high risk of nosocomial TB infection. The aim of this study was to determine whether the 
isolation rooms (IRs)in emergency centers, for patients with diagnosed or suspected TB, 
comply with set National Core Standards. 
 
Methods: This was a cross-sectional descriptive study of ECs in the Cape Town 
Metropolitan area. .The characteristics of IRs with regards to air changes per hour (ACH), 
negative pressure ventilation with relation to the surrounding areas and appropriate 
discharge of air outdoors or via filters before recirculation was measured using standard 
objective engineering methods..  
 
Results: 19 IRs in 8 ECs were evaluated, none of which complied with the National Core 
Standard’s ideal requirements for IRs. Five complied with minimal requirements .. Eleven 
(57,9%) IRs were designed to have negative pressure; and 8 (42,1%) rooms were not 
designed for isolation purposes, . IR volumes ranged from 15,5 m3 to 67,2 m3 (median 
35,6 m3).  
 
Five (26,3%) IRs were under negative pressure; 7 (36,8%) had erratic air flow; and 7 
(36,8%) showed positive airflow from the IR into adjacent clinical areas.  
Fifteen (78,9%) IRs had central provision of air via a ventilation system; 6 (31,6%) had 
central air extraction; 6 (31,6%) had local extraction; and 7 (36,8%) used natural 
ventilation only. Four local extraction units had zero flow rate. Airflow in naturally 
ventilated IRs was significantly lower than flow with other systems (p = 0,0002). The ACH 
ranged from 0 (n=4) to 112.37 (median 11,9); and was significantly greater in rooms 
ventilated with central extraction compared to other systems (p = 0,00002). 
 
 Discussion: The ventilation aspects of airborne infectious disease control are generally 
poorly implemented. This may contribute to, and fail to mitigate, the high risk of 
nosocomial transmission of airborne infectious diseases to staff and other patients utilising 
emergency facilities  in the TB endemic areas of Cape Town. 
 
Conclusion: Existing ECs should improve adherence to standards of airborne infectious 
disease transmission prevention in order to protect patients and staff from nosocomial 
airborne transmitted diseases, such as TB. New Hospitals should place a high priority on 
the amount, positioning and maintenance of IRs when planning their facility. 
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Introduction: 
 
Tuberculosis (TB) is a top infectious disease killer worldwide (1). TB is known to be a major 
healthcare problem globally, with particularly high prevalence in the Western Cape region 
of South Africa (SA) (2-6). 
There is good evidence to prove that a large proportion of new TB cases are due to 
nosocomial contraction of MTB and there are real concerns about the alarming incidence 
of TB contracted by health care workers (HCW’s) worldwide and in SA (10-15). Emergency 
Department (ED) staff specifically are exposed to an unexpectedly large TB burden in the 
workplace, with a resulting high rate of nosocomial TB infection. Therefore, TB infection 
control measures should be prioritized in EDs, especially in high-prevalence settings (9).  
Infection-control strategies to prevent airborne transmission of Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis (MTB) have long been a neglected component of TB control programs, with 
grave worldwide consequences (7). The World Health Organisation (WHO) strongly 
recommends ventilation to be prioritized and sees that the benefits of implementation of 
ventilation systems outweigh the disadvantages (8). There is an urgent need for effective 
non-medical TB control strategies in Emergency Centers (9). 
In SA, the “Regulations for Hazardous Biological Agents” document provides detailed 
descriptions and guidance on the protection of employees against infective agents (16). 
The need for occupational health and infection control programs is also mandated by the 
Department of Health in all healthcare facilities in South Africa, as described in the 
“National Core Standards for Health Establishments of South Africa” (17). Poor or absent 
infection control in health care facilities is considered unacceptable, contrary to set 
national standards and also illegal.  
According to South African guidelines, a patient with suspected or confirmed TB should be 
placed in a private room, ideally with: 1) continuous monitored negative air pressure in 
relation to surrounding areas, 2) a minimum of 6-12 air changes per hour, and 3) 
appropriate discharge of contaminated air to safety or a monitored high efficiency filtration 
of room air before circulation. If those conditions cannot be met, then the patient should 
be placed in a room with a simple extraction fan allowing at least 6 air changes per hour 
and/or a room with an open window and adequate ventilation (18). 
 
Despite the clear importance and need, the current adherence to WHO and national 
standards for ventilation aspects of airborne infection control has not been studied in the 
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South African Emergency Center context. This study therefore aimed to evaluate the 
compliance of ED isolation rooms to prescribed engineering standards for airborne 
infection control, in the Western Cape metropole, South Africa. 
 
Methods: 
A cross-sectional descriptive study design was performed. Standardised data collection 
forms (Appendices 1 and 2), developed according to WHO recommendations and the 
National Department of Health’s Core Standards for Health Establishments in South Africa  
(2011), were used to evaluate compliance with a number of stipulated engineering control 
requirements for airborne infection control. 
 
Measurements: 
A single operator (CG) conducted all measurements in a standardised  fashion. To 
measure the dimensions of a room, the measuring technique described in the 
methodology in Annexure B of the Draft National Infection Prevention and Control Policy 
for TB, MDR-TB and XDR-TB was followed, as described in Annexure C (19).   
A validated device (Lutron Anemometer Model AM-4203) was used to evaluate the 
velocity of airflow over areas contributing to the airflow of the room.  If the room made use 
of natural ventilation, then a measurement was taken over 10 minutes using averaged 
values for one-minute interval recordings. 
The number of air changes in the room per hour was calculated using standard methods, 
which have been described previously (20). Air flow visualization was done using the dry 
ice method (21). 
 
Study population and Sampling: 
All 10 emergency centers (EC) located in tertiary (n=2), regional (n=3), and district (n=5) 
hospitals within the Cape Metropol were eligible for inclusion, in order to represent all 
public sector centers in the Cape Metropole with regular emergency physician cover. The 
exact locations of the sites are not provided in order to maintain centre anonymity.  
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Ethical Considerations: 
The general ethical concerns related to health research do not apply directly to this study, 
since no human study participants were involved. Approval was obtained from the Human 
Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of the University of Cape Town (UCT) (HREC REF 
305/2015) and hospital superintendents consented to the evaluation of their emergency 
centers. 
Data Management and analysis: 
Data collected at each facility was captured on a standardised data capture sheet 
(Appendices 1 and 2) and transcribed onto a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  Accuracy of 
data entry was confirmed independently. Data were tested for normality using the 
Shapiro-Wilks W test. Data were found to be nonparametric and are therefore presented 
as median (interquartile range, IQR) throughout. Hypothesis testing was performed using 
the Chi-squared or Fishers Exact test, and differences between multiple groups 
(ventilation types) were determined using Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by ranks, with post-hoc 
Mann Whitney U tests in the event of significant between-groups differences.  A 
significance level of 0.05 was used for all hypothesis testing. 
Data analysis was conducted using both the PhStat add-in for Microsoft Excel (version 
2.5) and Stata/IC (Statacorp) for Windows, version 12.1. 
 
Results: 
Section A: Participating facilities and room characteristics. 
 
 
Two of the identified EC could not be included as superintendent consent was not 
obtained. Of the eight hospitals that participated, a total of 19 EC rooms used for isolating 
patients (range 1 to 5 per institution) were evaluated. Eleven (57,9%) of the isolation 
rooms were designated to function as isolation rooms with negative pressure ventilation, 
and 42,1% (n=8) were makeshift isolation rooms, having been initially built for a different 
purpose including fracture management and gynaecological examination. All the doors 
used provided an acceptable seal when closed. Only two of the isolation rooms had an 
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en-suite bathroom (with a toilet and shower).  None were fitted with ante-rooms. Isolation 
room volumes ranged from 15,5 m3 to 67,2 m3 (median 35,6 m3).  
 
 
Section B: Ventilation systems evaluation. 
 
 
Air pressure with relation to surrounding areas: Five (26,3%) of the total rooms were 
under negative pressure and seven had erratic air flow. Seven rooms (36,8%) showed 
positive airflow from the isolation room into adjacent clinical areas. Of the 11 rooms 




Figure 1: Isolation room airflow and pressure in relation to surrounding areas 
 
Type of ventilation systems: 
 
Fifteen of the facilities (78,9%) had central provision of air via an air handling (ventilation) 
system, with flow rates between zero and 4,6 m/s; six (31,6%) had central extraction of air 
via a ventilation system, with five of these rooms augmented by local extraction and one 
additional isolation room with local extraction (n=6, 31,6% local extraction); and seven 
(36,8%) isolation rooms made use of natural ventilation only  (Table 1). All of the local 
extraction units were fitted to the window or wall of the room and air was thus directed 
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the other two were broken. Flow rates of working ventilation units are presented in Table 
1. Airflow in naturally ventilated isolation rooms was significantly lower than flow with other 
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Figure 2: Difference in airflow amongst different ventilation systems (p = 0,004; difference 
between natural ventilation and other systems p = 0,0002). 
 
Air changes per hour (ACH):  The number of air changes per hour ranged from zero (n=4) 
to 112.37 (median 11,9; Table 2). Whether the contaminated air was vented to a safe 
area could only be verified in rooms where local extraction ventilation was provided. There 
was a significant difference in the number of ACH amongst different ventilation systems (p 
= 0,0026); with the number of ACH significantly greater in rooms ventilated with central 
extraction compared to other systems (p = 0,00002) (Figure 3). 
 
Table 2. Number of air changes per hour measured in the isolation rooms, by type of ventilation 
system used (p = 0,0026). 
Type of 
ventilation Median (IQR) 
Central provision 12.6 (1.5 - 23.9) 
Central extraction 24 (12.5 - 39.5) 
Local extraction 12.8 (12.0 - 29.3) 
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Figure 3: Number of air changes per hour amongst different ventilation types (p = 0,0026; 
difference between central extraction and other systems p = 0,00002). 
 
Maintenance:  In all cases where air was provided and extracted centrally, staff members 
were not able to verify whether fresh air was provided or whether the air was filtered and 
re-circulated. No unit was able to provide accurate information on the last date on which 
the ventilation systems were serviced or maintained, whether filtration systems were used 
and (if present) when these were last serviced. 
 
Regulatory requirements:  None of the isolation rooms used in any of the facilities met the 
"ideal requirements" stipulated in the “Regulations for Hazardous Biological Agents” (16). 
Five of the facilities (26,3%) met requirements without implementing negative pressure 
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have been largely neglected in emergency centers in the Cape Metropole, despite the 
high local prevalence of such diseases, especially TB. This neglect is in keeping with 
known literature (7, 9, 22). Airborne infectious diseases remain a very important occupational 
risk for HCWs and non-clinical workers working in these areas, and the risk is increased 
with inadequate infection control strategies (23). These findings show there is a high risk for 
the nosocomial transmission of airborne infectious diseases to all staff and patients 
utilizing ECs in the Cape Metropole, as is the case in other parts of the world (10, 23).  
 
None of the isolation rooms evaluated fulfilled the required legislative requirements and 
only a handful of facilities complied with the minimal requirements. It was striking that 
none of the staff could indicate when the last check was done, and did not know whom to 
contact regarding evaluation thereof, suggesting that the lack of compliance has been 
long standing. Due to the lack of negative pressure monitors in all the rooms, there was 
no way that staff could evaluate airflow, which further complicates adherence to 
suggested standard practice. 
 
Our results suggest that many patients with known or suspected TB are placed in rooms 
that are not designed to be used for isolation purposes. It is the author’s impression that 
the number of patients with known or suspected TB may outnumber the rooms available 
to accommodate them. These patients would then spend long durations in the emergency 
center, thereby increasing the duration of exposure to non-infected individuals. 
 
Despite the high prevalence of airborne infectious diseases locally, very few emergency 
facilities have isolation rooms designed to manage such patients, which is not in keeping 
with worldwide architectural guidelines (24, 25). Amongst facilities that were specifically 
designed to provide negative pressure ventilation, some actually provided positive 
pressure ventilation. Having a room under positive pressure places staff, patients and 
visitors under high risk for infection when they are in the immediately adjacent area. 
 
Just over one third of the isolation rooms used natural ventilation only, which was not 
always associated with negative pressure and has drawbacks such as unpredictable flow 
direction and closure of windows during tumultuous weather conditions (26, 27), further 
complicating adherence to ventilation standards. In addition, our results show poor air flow 
and low ACH with natural ventilation compared to other systems. By contrast, central 
extraction systems showed the highest number of ACH with adequate air flow rates, with 
50% of the rooms that make use of central extraction complying with minimal 
standards(28). The choice of environmental controls is intimately related to building design, 
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construction, renovation and use, which in turn must be tailored to local climatic and 
socioeconomic conditions (29). Our results suggest that airborne infection control standards 
are likely to be best achieved with the use of Central Extraction. 
 
It is clear that the design, layout, implementation, maintenance, and monitoring of 
airborne infection control is generally poorly implemented in ECs in Cape Town. This may 
predispose to the nosocomial spread of airborne infections diseases, including TB, and 
may be a contributing factor to the documented failure of TB infection control programmes 
(6). There is an urgent need for action to be taken to redress the lack of compliance to the 
engineering aspects of airborne infection control. 
 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses: 
 
Observations were conducted on a single day for each facility, which may not accurately 
reflect variation within facilities over time. Observations were also done over a period 
when the weather was mild and sunny (30), which could influence natural ventilation 
measurements.  
 





New emergency centers should consider local disease prevalence and plan the building 
of their facilities accordingly, whilst existing facilities should look at ways to improve 
compliance to ideal airborne infection control measures. Installation of negative pressure 
monitors for isolation rooms is strongly advocated. 
 
This study focused on infection control measures for patients with known or suspected 
airborne infectious diseases being managed in isolation facilities of EC. Future studies 
should also focus on airborne infection control measures for the whole facility, to protect 
patients and staff from nosocomial transmission of pathogens from asymptomatic 
individuals managed in general clinical areas. We also advise that future research be 
conducted to evaluate HCW’s knowledge of infection control for airborne disease spread. 
 
This study did not measure or record nosocomial infection rates within each centre, and 
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this would be useful to audit in future studies to determine the association between 
compliance to airborne infection control measures and nosocomial infection rates of 
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4.3 Appendices:  
Appendix 1: HREC approval letter: 





	   33	  
Appendix 2: Protocol: 
2.1 Background and literature review 
South Africa is known to suffer the 3rd highest incidence rate of tuberculosis (TB) in the 
world, with an estimated incidence rate for 2012 being 1000 or more cases per 100 000 
people 1.  Within South Africa, the Western Cape province has the highest incidence rate 
of all forms of TB cases in the country 2. However, even these figures are not providing a 
true reflection of the burden of TB disease.  The statistics provided by the World Health 
Organization are dependent on data captured into the national TB register (upon 
notification by health care practitioners).  Previous studies have indicated that a large 
number of cases are never reported.  The concerns expressed about the high number of 
multidrug resistant TB cases among South African health care workers (HCW) highlights 
the importance of adequate control measures 3. It is therefore clear that Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis is a major healthcare problem in Southern Africa, which affects both patients 
and HCW. The risk of transmission of M. tuberculosis from patients to HCW is a neglected 
problem in many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) 4.  
In the emergency care setting, it has been suggested that staff working in areas of high 
TB prevalence are frequently exposed to M. tuberculosis, yet infection control measures 
may be neglected and/ or harder to implement. Recent studies have reported that the 
incidence of occupational- acquired TB in health care workers from low and high- income 
countries was consistently higher than that of the general population; and was related to 
both the degree of TB exposure and TB infection control measures in place  2,4. 
The socio-economic implications of TB and multi-drug resistant (MDR) TB in HCW have 
important repercussions to the individual as well as the employer and the health service 
as a whole. This encompasses health concerns to the individual, loss of work hours and a 
large financial implication to the employer and individual.  The procedures for the 
management of a HCW who has contracted active TB are stipulated in Circular Instruction 
178 (2003), issued by the Department of Labour in terms of the Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 1993  5. 
The Regulations for Hazardous Biological Agents (published in terms of Section 43 of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993) provides detailed prescriptions and guidance 
on the protection of employees against infective agents 6.  These regulations also place 
the responsibility on the employer to “ensure that the workplace is safe and without risks 
to health”. The need for occupational health and infection control programs is also 
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mandated by the Department of Health in all healthcare facilities in South Africa, as 
described in the “National Core Standards for Health Establishments in South Africa” 7.  
Poor or absent infection control programs in health care facilities is considered 
unacceptable, contrary to set national standards and also illegal.  The South African 
National Policy on Infection Control presents minimum national standards for the effective 
prevention and management of healthcare associated infections, for both patients and 
HCW. This policy document states that every health-care setting should have a TB 
infection control program in place, as part of an overall infection-control program. These 
include administrative, environmental and respiratory protection policies and measures to 
prevent health-care associated transmission of M. tuberculosis 8. 
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have 
also formulated TB infection control guidelines for resource rich and resource limited 
nations on the basis of a 3-tiered approach  9 comprising 1) administrative or work practice 
controls; 2) environmental controls; and 3) personal protective equipment. 
Airborne infection-control strategies to prevent MTB transmission have long been a 
neglected component of TB infection control programs, with grave worldwide 
consequences 10. TB infection control builds on the implementation of general infection 
control efforts (“standard precautions”) and those aimed at controlling airborne infection. 
This may also help to de-stigmatize TB infection, because the focus of the public health 
interventions is on providing universal access for patients with symptoms of 
communicable diseases (in particular, respiratory infections, rather than TB only). The 
WHO strongly recommends ventilation to be prioritized and sees that the benefits of 
implementation of ventilation systems outweigh the disadvantages  9. In South Africa, 
minimum standards for airborne infection control include a simple extraction fan allowing 
at least six air changes per hour and/or a room with an open window and adequate 
ventilation. Under ideal circumstances, it is recommended that rooms have monitored 
negative air pressure relative to surrounding areas, with 6-12 air changes per hour and 
with appropriate discharge of air outdoors or a monitored high-efficiency filtration of room 
air before recirculation  6. 
The clear and present health risk, along with the emergence of newer drug resistant TB 
strains highlight the need for strengthened infection control measures. Despite the clear 
importance and need, the current adherence to WHO and National standards of airborne 
infection control, has not been studied in the South African emergency center context. 
2.2 Research Aim: 
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The primary aim of this study is to evaluate the compliance of emergency centers 
throughout the Cape Metropolitan region to predefined engineering control requirements 
for airborne infection control. 
Engineering control measures are further defined as measures that remove or reduce the 
exposure of persons at the workplace by means of engineering methods  6. 
2.3 Motivation for the study: 
Considering the potential impact of TB transmission to health care workers from patients, 
and between patients in the Western Cape, it is necessary to conduct an audit to 
determine current standards of airborne infection control in emergency centers throughout 
this high- TB prevalence region. The results of this study could then form a basis for 
monitoring and practice improvement initiatives in the Western Cape Tertiary, Regional 
and District Hospitals.  
2.4 Purpose of the study:  
If the evaluation finds the systems to be in keeping with recommended guidelines, the 
investigation could serve as partial fulfillment of the obligation of the Department of Health 
(in terms of Regulation 12 of the Regulations for Hazardous Biological Agents) to maintain 
engineering control measures to prevent spread of airborne diseases  6. In addition the 
strengths of compliant institutions could be appraised with positive feedback. 
If the evaluation finds the ventilation systems to be lacking or not complying with the 
recommendations, then there is a need to address this crucial part of infection control, 
through targeted practice improvement initiatives, in order to reduce health care worker 
and patient exposure to airborne diseases. This is further in accordance with the National 
Health Act 61 of 2003  11, which emphasizes the need to establish structures to monitor 
compliance of health care establishments with health care standards. Ultimately, by 
improving compliance with infection control standards, the aims of the National Core 
Standards document (2011) will be upheld – to reduce unintended harm to health care 
users and staff in terms of preventing or minimizing health-care associated infectious 
diseases (including TB)  7.  
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2.5 Methodology: 
2.5.1 Study Design: 
A prospective descriptive study design will be used. 
 
2.5.2 Study population and sampling: 
No patient data will be used for this study. The district and regional hospitals in the Cape 
Town Metropole area with emergency centers will be purposively sampled. The 9 
emergency centers were purposively sampled; as they represent all the Emergency 
Physician led units or Family Physician units with regular Emergency Physician cover. 
The findings of this study will lead to education and system improvements driven through 
the Division of Emergency Medicine. Thus these units allow us to implement changes 
based on the study and in future the division could evaluate the impact of these changes. 
Specific centers to be studied are:  
• Tertiary Hospitals: Groote Schuur Hospital C15 unit and Tygerberg Hospital F1 
unit 
 
• Regional hospitals: Victoria Hospital Wynberg, New Somerset Hospital and Paarl  
• District Hospitals:  Mitchell’s Plain, Khayalitsha,, Helderberg, Eerste River and Karl 
Bremer. 
2.5.3 Research procedures and data collection 
The research team will be evaluating facilities (engineering controls) for patients who are 
known to suffer (or there is a very high suspicion for) airborne diseases. If the facility does 
not have an isolation room, the room in which such patients will be treated by the staff will 
be evaluated. A standardized data collection form (Appendix 1), developed according to 
the World Health Organization (WHO) recommendations  9 and National Department of 
Health’s Core Standards for Health Establishments in South Africa  (2011)  7, will be used 
to evaluate compliance with a number of stipulated engineering control requirements for 
airborne infection control.  
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 These include: 
a) Building structure – including the presence, number, location and adequate 
functioning of isolation rooms. 
b) Ventilation systems – including the presence of negative pressure, number of air 
changes per hour and presence of external vents.  
These observations will be conducted by personal observation, and if any aspects are not 
visible, the facility engineer will be contacted to determine compliance. 
2.5.4 Measurements: 
The measurement of air velocities will be performed by making use of the Lutron 
Anemometer (Model AM-4203).  The device is factory-calibrated and does not allow any 
manual calibration.  Measurements are accurate enough for the purposes of this study. 
Further information on this device is available at http://gonewtech.co.kr/123image/lut/AM-
4203.pdf. The number of air changes in the room per hour will be calculated as follows: 
Step 1: Calculate the volume of fresh air supplied: 
a. Calculate the surface area of the supply duct (or window, if natural ventilation is 
used) 
b. Multiply this by the measured air flow rate in front of the duct (or window) 
c. Multiply this by 3600 to obtain the fresh air supply in m3/hour 
Step 2: Calculation of the volume of the room or facility. A normal builder’s measuring 
tape will be used which is accurate to the nearest millimeter. The measuring technique is 
consistent with the methodology described in Annexure B of the Draft National Infection 
Prevention and Control Policy for TB, MDR-TB and XDR-TB8 
a. Multiply the width, length and height of each room (to obtain the volume in m3) 
b. Add the volume of all rooms that are supplied by a single fresh air source 
 Step 3: Calculate the air exchange rate by dividing the fresh air supply by the volume of 
the room or facility (which yields the number of air changes per hour). 









Smoke testing will be done to determine if a room is under negative pressure. The smoke 
will be generated by adding water to dry ice about 5cm in front of the door close to the 
bottom. Care will be taken to release the smoke slowly as to not overpower the air 
velocity. If the room is under negative pressure, the smoke will travel inwards towards the 
room. If the room is not under negative pressure, the smoke will be blown away or stay 
stationary. 
If the facility relies on windows (natural ventilation) as the primary ventilation source and 
these are closed at the time of the audit, then this will be captured as such on the day, 
and thus reflect as a lack of compliance to ventilation standards. 
Since this study represents an audit of the ventilation systems, the evaluation will follow 
the normal practice for an audit; in that, when a room is not functional at the time of 
evaluation, it will be recorded as such. No facility will be revisited.  The same argument 
will be applied to facilities that are fully compliant at the time of the audit – these will also 
not be revisited, although it is conceivable that such a unit may be rendered non-
functional the next day. 
2.5.5 Data management and analysis: 
Data collected at each facility will be captured on the data capture sheet and transcribed 
onto a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  Accuracy of the data will be confirmed by verification 
checks performed by the supervisor.  After the accuracy of data entry is verified, the 
original data capture sheets will be scanned and saved electronically in a password-
Example air exchange rate calculation8: 
 
Window opening:   0.5m 
high x 0,5m wide 
Window area =    0,5m x 
0,5m = 0,25m2 
 
Average air velocity through window:  0,5m/s 
 
Room dimensions: 3m wide, 5m deep, and 3m high 
Room Volume = 3mx5mx3m = 45m3 
Average flow rate =  Area of window times average air velocity 
 0,25m2 x 0,5m/s x 3600s/hour = 450m3/hour 
 
Air exchange rate =  Average flow rate divided by room volume 
 450 m3/hour   ÷ 45m3 = 10 air exchanges per hour 
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protected file that is only accessible to the study team.  The hard (paper) copies of the 
data capture sheets will be shredded. 
Data will be analyzed and presented using tables, graphs and descriptive statistics (as 
appropriate).  Numerical data will be described as means (with standard deviations) or 
medians (with interquartile ranges) if the data is skewed.  Categorical data will be 
described using proportions (or percentages).  Population estimates will be described 
using 95% confidence intervals. 
If considered appropriate, associations will be measured by means of odds ratios (using 
contingency tables), with 95% confidence intervals.  While this is not primarily planned, 
hypothesis testing may be performed if deemed appropriate (dependent on the data found 
during the study).  This will be done using the Chi-squared test (or the Fishers Exact test if 
individual cell frequencies are too low).  A significance level of 0.05 will be used for all 
hypothesis tests. 
All the abovementioned procedures will be performed using a combination of the PhStat 
add-in for Microsoft Excel (version 2.5), and Stata/IC (Statacorp) for Windows, version 
12.1. 
2.6 Ethical and Legal considerations 
The general ethical concerns related to health research do not apply directly to this study, 
since no human study participants are involved. We will therefore request an expedited 
Human Research Ethics Committee review if exemption from review is not permitted.  
The study team takes cognisance of the principles enshrined in the Declaration of Helsinki 
(2013), as well as those in the “Good Clinical Practice” documents and other relevant 
legislative and ethical guidance texts and will adopt the principles and apply these to this 
study scenario: 
Beneficence:  The individual units may not directly benefit as a result of the study, 
although it will be useful for these units to know the functionality of the ventilation systems 
that are installed.  If problems are identified and addressed, it would ultimately result in 
increased patient and HCW safety. 
Non-maleficence:  No individual will be harmed as a result of this study.  Due care will be 
taken that the study procedures do not interfere with patient care provided at the facilities.  
Data will be de-identified during the analysis phase of the study, so that individual facilities 
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cannot be recognized when aggregate data is reported (although detailed feedback will be 
given to each facility regarding their own systems). 
Autonomy and consent:  No unit will be evaluated if permission to collect data on their 
premises is denied. Permission to perform the study will first be obtained from the 
Departmental Research Committee; the institutional Human Research Ethics Committee; 
and then the protocol will be submitted to the National Health Research Database 
(http://nhrd.hst.org.za/ ) to obtain access to facilities under the authority of Provincial 
Health. 
Confidentiality:  Only the principle investigator and direct supervisors would know 
individual unit details. No institution will be singled out or mentioned by name in the 
aggregate reports/ publications.  The individual institutions will be allocated a letter of the 
alphabet in the final database used for analysis.  
Actions related to gross abnormalities:  If any gross abnormalities are noted, it will be 
directed to the responsible person of that specific unit (highlighting the legislative 
requirements), without publicly stating any collected data.  Infection Prevention and 
Control information will also be made available to such a unit, in order to allow them to 
prioritize administrative control measures and personal protective equipment in order to 
mitigate the risk. 
2.7 Reporting and dissemination of results: 
The results will be written up and reported in the form of a research report that meets the 
requirements of the MMed (Emergency Medicine) degree program. 
The research team will also publish the findings of this study in a locally relevant peer-
reviewed scientific journal. 
Individual units, institutions and their staff will be informed about the findings of this study 
by means of a meeting scheduled with the responsible person. Feedback will be given to 
the Provincial Department of Health as required by the Provincial Research Committee. 
2.8 Logistics and Time Schedule 
Responsibilities of investigators 
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The principle investigator will collect the data and organize it, with appropriate oversight 
from the student’s supervisors. Venues will be contacted prior to evaluation in the 3-month 
data collection period and personal transport will be used to visit the locations in order to 
capture the data. 
Project Timeline 
2015 March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan 
EM DRC X X          
Sx DRC  X X         




    X       
Data 
collection 
     X X     
Data 
analysis 
       X    
Final write-
up 
        X X  
Thesis 
submission 
          X 
 
Budget: 



















5 pages / 
institution (9 
insitutions) 
1 container of 
3mm pellets. 20 








    
Transport to sites  
 





















    
Anemometer  R4500 1 R4500 
Total    R 11148,50 
Sources of funding: 
The anemometer will be made available via the Unit for Infection Prevention and Control 
(the main study supervisor is the head of this unit).  The other expenses will be borne by 
the student investigator  
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beds available in 
emergency units 
 





Number of side 




Number of side 










Can staff indicate 
(provide a written  
report) when the 
last test of the 
ventilation unit 
was performed to 
confirm correct 
airflow? 
YES (date) NO 
What is the 
location of the 
isolation room/s in 
the unit? 
FRONT MIDDLE BACK 
If present, the 
isolation room/s 
are fitted with (tick 
all applicable) 
En-suite bathroom En-suite shower En-suite toilet 
Is an anteroom 
present (Y/N) 
 
Does the isolation 
facility have a 
Isolation facility has 
negative pressure 
No pressure difference 
was detected 
Irregular air flow 
detected 
	   46	  
negative pressure 
compared to the 








for the isolation 


















If single room 
facility, what is the 
number of air 
changes per hour 
with 
Door open: Door closed: 
Is air coming from 
the isolation room: 
Recirculated  
yes/ no / uncertain 
Filtered  
yes/ no / uncertain 
 
Does the staff 
(responsible person) 
know of the date when 
the filter was last 
checked? 
Yes / no / uncertain 
 
Is it within the last 
month? 
Yes / no / uncertain 
 
 
Directly vented to the 
outside  
yes/ no / uncertain 
What is the 
location of the 
exhaust vent? 
 
To an outside wall or window  
yes/ no/ unsure 
 
Considered safe in terms of 
contamination of other areas? i.e. 
close to an intake/open window? 
yes/ no/ unsure 
 
What type of door 

















**Evaluation of airflow with all different combinations and permutations of doors of the isolation 
room being open and/or closed. 
 
For each combination state that the airflow in the doorway indicates that the isolation room is under 
negative pressure 
 
Permutations and combinations of door positions 
HALLWAY BATHROOM ANTEROOM 
Isolation rooms with bathrooms and anterooms 
Open Open Open 
  Closed Closed Closed 
Closed Closed Open 
Closed Open Closed 
Open Closed Closed 
Closed Open Open 
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Open Closed Open 
Open Open Closed 
Isolation rooms with bathrooms, but without anterooms 
Closed Closed   
Open Open   
Closed Open   
Open Closed   
Isolation rooms without anterooms or bathrooms 
Closed     
Open     
  
	   	  
	   48	  




	   	  Measurements	  per	  Room:	   	  	  
Hospital:	   	  	  
Room	  identification/Name:	   	  	  
Room	  Volume:	   	  	  
Central	  Prov	  Parameters:	   	  	  
Central	  Prov	  Flow:	   	  	  
Central	  Extract	  Parameters:	   	  	  
Central	  Extract	  Flow:	   	  	  
Local	  Extract	  Parameters:	   	  	  
Local	  Extract	  Flow:	   	  	  
Local	  Provide	  Parameters:	   	  	  
Local	  Provide	  Flow:	   	  	  
Natrural	  Vent	  (window)	  
Measurements:	   	  	  
Natural	  Vent	  Flow:	   	  	  
Air	  Changes	  /	  Hour	   	  	  
Pressure	  door	  closed:	   	  	  
Pressure	  door	  open:	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4.4. Instructions to Authors 
 
The Instructions to Authors for The Journal of Hospital Infection is multi-page document 
available in PDF format and the link is attached below: 
	  
https://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/623052?generate
pdf=true 
 
 
 
 
 
